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Abstract—Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication networks
enable safety applications via periodic broadcast of Basic Safety
Messages (BSMs) or safety beacons. Beacons include time-critical
information such as sender vehicle’s location, speed and direction.
The vehicle density may be very high in certain scenarios
and such V2V networks suffer from channel congestion and
undesirable level of packet collisions; which in turn may seriously
jeopardize safety application reliability and cause collision risky
situations. In this work, we perform experimental analysis of
safety application reliability (in terms of collision risks), and
conclude that there exists a unique beacon rate for which the
safety performance is maximized, and the optimal beacon rate is
unique for varying vehicle densities. The collision risk of a certain
vehicle is computed using a simple kinematics-based model, and
is based on tracking error, defined as the difference between
vehicle’s actual position and the perceived location of that vehicle
by its neighbors (via most-recent beacons). Furthermore, we
analyze the interconnection between the collision risk and two
well-known network performance metrics, Age of Information
(AoI) and throughput. Our experimentation shows that AoI has a
strong correlation with the collision risk and AoI-optimal beacon
rate is similar to the safety-optimal beacon rate, irrespective
of the vehicle densities, queuing sizes and disciplines. Whereas
throughput works well only under higher vehicle densities.
Index Terms—V2V, DSRC, Tracking error, Collision Risk, Age
of Information, Throughput, Queues
I. INTRODUCTION
Communication in Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) and
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) networks has been a topic of active
research due to its potential to reduce vehicle collisions
and other applications. The two standards established for it
are Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) and
Cellular V2X (C-V2X). DSRC is based on 802.11 WiFi-based
technology that establishes a decentralized network. DSRC
relies on the 802.11p standard, though efforts are ongoing to
come up with a better version called 802.11bd [1]. The other
standard is Cellular-V2X (C-V2X) which was developed by
3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) in its Rel-14. It
is a cellular based technology with additional transmission
modes that uses the sidelink interface PC5 for direct V2X
communications, and the newer version is called New-Radio
V2X (NR-V2X) [1]. Currently, the three major V2X use
cases are: basic safety messages, cooperative traffic efficiency
messages and media sharing applications.
• Basic Safety Messages (BSMs) or safety beacons: Peri-
odically broadcast low latency messages (≤ 100 ms) that
carry information about vehicle position, speed etc.
• Cooperative traffic efficiency messages: Event triggered
low latency (≤ 200 ms) messages initiated by traffic
management systems designed to improve traffic flow.
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• Media Sharing Applications: Peer-to-peer Infotainment
content is shared among nearby vehicles.
Basic Safety Messages (BSMs) or safety beacons enable
several safety applications like Forward Collision Warning,
Blind Spot/Lane Change Warning, Intersection Movement
Assist etc. and enhances road safety by greatly minimizing
the collision risky situations1. This is because safety beacons
facilitate accurate positioning or localization of neighboring
vehicles. In such V2V networks, it is imperative that the
safety beacons are not lost due to packet collisions due to
congestion, and that the beacons are up-to-date and fresh.
Lost or outdated safety beacons will negatively impact the
reliability of safety applications as it will lead to increased
occurrence of collision risky situations. Collision risk increases
due to wrong localization of neighboring vehicles or in other
words, high tracking error. Tracking error is the difference
between a vehicle’s actual location and perceived location of
that vehicle by its neighbors (via safety beacons).
Safety beacon rate, i.e., the rate at which beacons are
broadcast, becomes a critical parameter in order to ensure
minimal channel congestion and improved reliability of safety
applications. In 802.11p DSRC standard, the beacon rate is
set to 10 Hz, which may not work well in all V2V network
scenarios, as also pointed out by existing works [2]. Consider
the following two instances: (i) high vehicle density scenarios
- the V2V network would likely suffer from high channel
congestion and undesirable level of packet collisions even
when beacon rate is as low as 10 Hz, and (ii) low vehicle
density scenarios - the reliability of safety applications can
be further enhanced with increased beacon rate (above 10
Hz), as higher beacon rate would improve the freshness of
the information and packet collisions do not worsen (as the
channels can support higher beacon rate for fewer vehicles).
Refer to Section II for a detailed overview of related works.
In this paper, we perform a comprehensive investigation of
the safety applications reliability against varying safety beacon
rates and vehicle densities through experimental analysis based
on ns-3 network simulator2. We utilize Collision risk as the
metric for safety application reliability, which is computed
using a simple kinematics-based model based on tracking
error. We observe that there exists an optimal beacon rate for
which the collision risk is minimized, and the optimal value
is unique for varying vehicle densities. For instance, in our
experiments, the safety-optimal beacon rate for 50 vehicles/km
is 25 Hz whereas it is 10 Hz for 200 vehicles/km.
Furthermore, we investigate two well-known network met-
rics, namely Age of Information (AoI) [3] and Throughput, and
1Additional sensors like camera, radars are also being increasingly used for
safety application purpose
2https://www.nsnam.org/
2analyze their relation with safety performance, i.e., collision
risk. AoI is a recently conceived network metric that captures
the freshness of information, which is of greater interest to
time-sensitive V2V networks. AoI is defined as the time
elapsed since the last beacon was received at a certain vehicle
from the beacon’s generation time. On the contrary the second
metric, throughput, is defined as the rate of data transfer and
has been studied extensively in various wireless networks [4].
Our results shows that AoI-optimal beacon rate has a strong
correlation with the safety-optimal beacon rate, irrespective of
varying vehicle densities and queuing considerations. Whereas
throughput-optimal rate works well for safety only at higher
vehicle densities. The results also indicate that longer queues
lead to high queuing delay and packet loss, and thus a queue
size of 1 is both AoI and throughput optimal in all scenarios.
The paper is organized as follows. Sec. II discusses the re-
lated works. Sec. III describes the tracking error and collision
risk whereas Sec. IV presents the two network metrics, i.e.,
AoI and throughput. Sec. V details the experimental analysis.
Finally, Sec.VI concludes the paper.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
This section discusses the related works on safety perfor-
mance, AoI and throughput in the context of V2V networks.
In [5], the authors analyzed the effect of beacon rate on
network performance of safety messages in V2V networks,
and developed a framework to recommend beacon rates based
on the message utility maximization. Remote mobility esti-
mators were used in [6] and [7] to control tracking error
using adaptive beacon rates. The authors used Channel Busy
Ratio (CBR) for controlling beacon rate in [8] to improve
safety information dissemination range. [9] and [10] define risk
metrics based on the vehicle dynamics and traffic situation,
which are then used to select beacon rates. In [11], an adaptive
beacon rate algorithm was designed to improve safety in
terms of beacon inter-reception time. All these works focus
on improving safety performance via controlling beacon rates.
On contrary, this paper investigates the relationship of safety
performance with varying vehicle densities and queue sizes
and disciplines, in addition to beacon rates. Furthermore, we
investigate the interconnection of safety application reliability
with two network metrics, i.e., AoI and Throughput.
AoI was introduced in [3] and a distributed algorithm for
rate adaptation to reduce AoI was proposed in it. In [12], the
authors develop an analytical model that takes into account the
Carrier Sense Multiple Access (CSMA) contention to improve
the AoI in a V2V network. Llatser et al. [13] simulated
a convoy of automated vehicles where AoI was analyzed
along with other parameters for changing convoy-size and
beacon rates. A centralized scheduling scheme for beacon
broadcasting was designed in [14] to minimize AoI and it was
shown to outperform DSRC in terms of fairness and number
of effective neighbors. Other papers that deal with AoI can be
found in [15]. On the other hand, throughput is a classical
metric and it has been well studied for various networks.
[4] lists several of the works that analyses throughput in
V2V networks. However, none of these works investigate
their interconnection with safety performance, which is a key
requirement to minimize collision risky situations.
III. TRACKING ERROR AND COLLISION RISK
The calculation of the tracking error and the resulting
collision risk is explained below:
A. Tracking Error
Consider a basic transmitter vehicle and a receiver vehicle
that sends and receives beacons, respectively. Let the most
recent beacon from sender u to receiver v carry the information
that u’s location is x
t′
1
uv , which is true at the packet generation
time t′
1
. At time t1 when the beacon is received, the position
of u has changed to xt1u . The tracking error at v while tracking
u at time t1 with a reception is [7]:
δpost1uv = |x
t1
u − x
t′
1
uv|, where t
′
1
< t1 (1)
We consider x-coordinate to calculate the tracking error as the
vehicles move in x-direction only. See Sec.V-A for details. The
error in Eqn.1 occurs because (i) the beacon takes non-zero
time to be delivered to the receiver after being generated, and
(ii) the sender would likely move a certain distance during this
time period. For large time delays, the beacon’s information is
relatively outdated. Packet losses will further deteriorate this
error. If there were beacon receptions at instants t1 and t2
whose generation times are t′
1
and t′
2
respectively, the errors
at times t1 and t2 are calculated using Eqn.1. However, at
time instant t1 < t˜ < t2, where were no beacon receptions,
we compute the tracking error at vehicle v at time t˜, as follows:
δpost˜uv = |x
t˜
u − x
t′
1
uv| (2)
where xt˜u is the location of vehicle u at time instant t˜, which
can be computed as the product of vehicle u’s speed and time
difference |t˜ − t1|. x
t′
1
uv is the location of u as per the last
beacon received at vehicle v from vehicle u at t1. Therefore the
tracking error is calculated using Eqn.1 at instants of beacon
reception and Eqn.2 at instants of no reception.
In the observation interval T , the average tracking error for
a certain vehicle pair u− v, is as follows:
δposuv =
1
T
∫
T
δpostuv (3)
where t represents any instant in the observation interval T
including both the instants of reception and non-reception.
B. Collision Risk
Time To Collision (TTC) for a pair of vehicles is defined
as the time taken for the distance between the pair of vehicles
to become 0, which denotes a possible collision between
them. We relate the collision risk to the error in the TTC,
which results from the tracking error. The collision scenario
is shown in Fig. 1. Every vehicle continuously monitors the
TTC with respect to its neighbors as it is a key indicator of
safety application reliability [9]. High TTCs mean that the
neighboring vehicles are far apart and there is no immediate
threat of collision and vice versa.
At any time t, the receiver v calculates TTC with respect
to its neighbor u based on the beacon sent by u as:
TTCtuv,calc = |
1
suv
(xtv − x
t′
uv)| (4)
3Fig. 1: TTC Calculation
xtv is v’s actual position at time t and x
t′
uv is u’s location as
per the last beacon received at v from u with generation time
t′. suv is the relative velocity between them.
However, the actual TTC at time t is:
TTCtuv,act = |
1
suv
(xtv − x
t
u)| (5)
as at t, sender u is at xtu and not x
t′
uv . So the tracking error
affects the TTC calculation. This TTC error at any time t can
be calculated as the absolute value of the difference between
Eqn.4 and Eqn.5, and is equal to δTTCtuv =
δpost
uv
suv
. In the
observation interval T , the average TTC error for u-v is:
δTTCuv =
1
T
∫
T
δTTCtuv =
δposuv
suv
(6)
This δTTCtuv can lead to risky situations and its significance
in collision warning was studied in [16]. E.g. suppose v has
overestimated/underestimated3 the TTC to u and is about to
take a route/maneuver decision based on this erroneous value
of TTC. Such a situation can be safely averted by manual
intervention if the time taken by the driver to react and apply
the brakes to make the vehicle stop is less than δTTCtuv . But
if this error exceeds the driver’s controllability, it presents a
risky scenario. We classify the scenario to be risky if:
δTTCuv > treact + tbrake (7)
We use a Gaussian distribution to model the speeds of the
vehicles with a mean of 25 m/s and a variance of 3 m/s [17].
treact is taken to be 1s [9] and is the time taken by the driver
to respond to the situation and apply the brakes. We take the
common deceleration of all the vehicles as 4.6 m/s2 [9], and
this leads to a value of tbrake = 5.43 s for the vehicles to
come to a complete stop. Eqn. 7 then becomes: δTTCuv >
6.43 s for a scenario to be risky.
For every simulation performed, we count the proportion of
the vehicle pairs whose δTTCuv exceeded 6.43 s during the
interval they communicated. This is taken as the measure of
the overall safety performance of the network. The logic is
that if δTTCuv was under threshold for a particular pair, the
receiver’s routing/maneuver decisions would have considered
the correct location of the sender most of the times. So it is
unlikely that the receiver’s actions will cause any collisions.
It should be kept in mind that the TTC error arises solely due
to the tracking error, which in turn arises due to the delay and
packet loss in the communication. Thus the safety performance
is being measured from a purely communications point of
view, and no other phenomenon is considered.
3We consider both overestimating and underestimating TTC to be hazardous
as overestimating means the vehicles get too close, and decisions based on
underestimated values will impact the other neighbors
IV. AGE OF INFORMATION AND THROUGHPUT
In this section, we briefly discuss two network metrics, i.e.,
Age of Information (AoI), and throughput. In the following
Section V, we study their interconnection with safety perfor-
mance, i.e., collision risk, under various V2V scenarios.
A. Age of Information
Age of Information (AoI) at the receiving vehicles is
calculated as the time elapsed since the received beacon was
generated at the sender until the beacon’s reception time. It is
equal to the end-to-end delays at the instants of reception, with
linear increase between receptions. While delay is associated
with the packets and is undefined when there is no reception,
AoI can be thought of as a continuous variable that is defined
for the entire observation interval. We define the observation
interval T as the interval between the reception of the first and
the last beacons between a sender and a receiver. The average
AoI is calculated as the total area under the age plot normal-
ized by the observation interval [3], i.e. △uv =
1
T
∫
T
△tuv ,
where △tuv represents the AoI of vehicle u’s information at
vehicle v. It is calculated as △tuv = t − g(t) at instant t,
with g(t) being the generation time of the most recent packet
received by v. The system AoI with N vehicles is calculated
across N(N − 1) unique pairs of sender and receiver as:
△ =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
u
∑
v 6=u
△uv (8)
As our work is focused on safety applications, we don’t
consider Last Come First Serve (LCFS) queues of sizes more
than 1, as having a bigger LCFS queue provides no practical
utility in terms of time-sensitive information. This is because
an LCFS queue will send out the most recently generated
packet first making the older packets wait, and these older
packets do not add any value to the receiver vehicle after
the newer packet has been received. They are differentiated
as informative and non-informative packets [18]. However for
the sake of completeness, we show the variation of AoI in a
specific case with LCFS queues in Fig. 2. It can be seen that
in LCFS, queue sizes do not make a big difference in AoI. In
the rest of our analysis, we won’t be showing the LCFS results
as LCFS of the considered queue sizes (1,5,10,100 packets)
perform very close to a First Come First Come (FCFS) queue
of size 1 as per Fig.24. Therefore, the AoI performance of an
LCFS queue can be roughly assumed to have a performance
similar to that of an FCFS for queue size 1. The reception
of non-informative packets do not lead to any reduction in
AoI [18]. This can also be understood in terms of tracking
error: once the recent location of a vehicle is known via a
recent beacon, the location information obtained from the older
beacons that are transmitted after the newer beacon in an LCFS
queue do not add any value. Tracking error for any LCFS
queue then becomes similar to FCFS queue’s tracking error
of queue size 1. As collision risk is computed directly from
the tracking error, the above property of LCFS queue applies
to collision risk in LCFS queues too.
4a small but negligible AoI difference between queue sizes of 1 and 100
can be noticed for 200 veh/km.
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Fig. 2: Age in an LCFS queue
B. Throughput
Throughput is a measure of the rate of data transfer, and
it is calculated as the total data transferred in the entire
simulation. Taking τ as the observation interval and K as
total packets transferred in that duration, total throughput =
K
τ
packets per second. Average throughput per vehicle can be
obtained by normalizing the total throughput with the number
of vehicles. Throughput is not affected by LCFS/FCFS, and
the performance of an LCFS queue would be exactly same as
than of a FCFS queue of the same size.
V. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
This section describes the simulation setup, followed by
performance analysis of safety application reliability, i.e., col-
lision risk and two network metrics, i.e., AoI and Throughput,
against varying beacon rates and vehicle densities.
A. Simulation Setup
We utilize Network Simulator 3 (ns-3) for our experimental
study. We consider that the vehicles are placed uniformly5
along a 3-lane highway of length 1 Km. The vehicles move
along the highway at constant speeds along the x-axis without
any lateral movement across the lanes, until the simulation
ends. Unless otherwise stated, the beacon/transmission rates
were varied from 1 Hz to 80 Hz, and a small random number
is added to this rate to ensure that all the vehicles do not
attempt transmission at the same time [3]. The packet sizes
are set to 320 bytes The queue sizes are varied between 1,
5, 10 and 100 packets, and the queue discipline is the FCFS.
Recall LCFS is equivalent to FCFS with size 1, irrespective of
queue sizes for LCFS. A list of the important parameters used
in the simulation along with their values are given in Table I.
TABLE I: Parameters used to set up the simulation
Parameters Value
Vehicle Density 50 veh/km - 200 veh/km
Number of Lanes 3
Lane Width 4 m
Packet Size 320 bytes
Data Rate 6 Mbps
Loss Model Log Distance Propagation Loss
Path Loss exponent γ = 3
Channel Frequency 5.9 GHz
Channel Bandwidth 10 MHz
Vehicle Speeds N (25 m/s, 3 m/s)
tbrake 5.43 s
treact 1 s
Antennas/Spatial Streams 1/1
B. Experimental Results
In the following, we discuss the comparative analysis of
Collision risk, AoI, and Throughput against varying beacon
rates and vehicle densities.
5This uniform placement of vehicles do not affect the results as the average
measures for random and uniform placement are very similar [8]
Collision Risk Analysis: Fig. 3 depicts how collision risk
varies with varying beacon rates, under considered vehicle
densities of 50 vehicles/Km and 200 vehicles/Km. Collision
risk is minimal at 25 Hz for 50 veh/km whereas 10 Hz
for 200 veh/km, which means that there is a unique beacon
rate for a certain vehicle density that maximizes the safety
application reliability. Furthermore, note that there exists a
convex relationship between the collision risk and beacon
rates, which hints that gradient-descent algorithms may be
utilized to analytically determine the optimal safety-optimal
beacon rate. (We will investigate this as a part of our future
work.) From this analysis, it is clear that enforcing a fixed
beacon rate of 10 Hz (by DSRC standard) may not be optimal
in all V2V scenarios. Regarding the queuing sizes, collision
risk remains unaffected for lower beacon rates, however, it
increases gradually after 35 Hz for lower vehicle density, and
after 25 Hz for higher vehicle density. Longer queues perform
poorly compared to that of shorter queues, and interestingly,
queue size 1 performs the best. These observations can mainly
be credited to its correlation with AoI (next paragraph).
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Fig. 3: Collision risk vs Beacon rates
AoI Analysis: Fig.4 depicts the relationship between AoI and
safety beacon rates under varying vehicle densities. Similar to
collision risk, it is interesting to see that AoI is also a convex
function of beacon rate. More interestingly, the AoI-optimal
beacon rate is the same as the safety-optimal beacon rate, for
both the considered vehicle densities. This is an important
result as it establishes that AoI and safety application reliabil-
ity are highly correlated, and safety application’s beacon rate
algorithm can reliably undertake AoI minimization as the sole
objective, rather than safety application reliability6.
Similar to collision risk, AoI also remains unaffected for
lower beacon rates, and after optimal beacon rate, it increases
gradually for both the density scenarios. Smaller queues have
lower AoI and this can be largely attributed to lower queuing
delays. Fig. 5 shows that delays are lower for shorter queues,
which in turn results in lower AoI and vice-versa. At very high
beacon rates, the network becomes saturated, which results in
a saturation in AoI, as also pointed out in the literature [12].
An important observation is that at lower beacon rates, delay
is less (Fig.5) as the channel resources are available whereas
the collision risk is very high (Fig. 3). This shows that lower
delay doesn’t guarantee higher safety performance. However
similar to collision risk, AoI is higher for both lower and
higher beacon rates. AoI is higher for lower beacon rates due
6Computing safety application reliability, i.e., collision risk, in real-time is
very hard in V2V networks compared to that of AoI, a network metric.
5to the high inter-arrival times while at higher beacon rates,
AoI is higher mainly due to higher queuing delays.
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Throughput Analysis: Fig. 7 shows the gradual increase in
throughput until it peaks, and then it saturates to a lower value.
For 200 veh/Km, it peaks at 15 Hz and starts saturating from
35 Hz; while it doesn’t saturate until 80 Hz for 50 veh/Km.
Notice that for lower vehicle density, the throughput-optimal
beacon rate (80 Hz) is very far from safety-optimal rate (25
Hz), however, for higher vehicle density, throughput-optimal
beacon rate (15 Hz) is closer to the safety-optimal rate (10 Hz),
and performs quite well in terms of collision risk. Similar to
collision risk and AoI, a queue size of 1 is throughput-optimal,
and this can be attributed to the fact that packet loss due to
packet collisions is less for smaller queues, compared to that
of larger queues [19] (See Fig. 6).
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we performed a comprehensive experimental
analysis of safety application reliability (in terms of collision
risks) against beacon rates and vehicle densities for V2V
networks, and concluded that there exists a unique beacon rate
for which the safety application reliability is maximized, and
it is unique for each vehicle density. Furthermore, our exper-
iments showed that there exists a strong correlation between
collision risk and Age of Information (AoI) notwithstanding
vehicle densities, and other queuing parameters. Whereas, the
throughput-optimal rate approaches safety-optimal beacon rate
only under higher vehicle densities. Queue size of 1 is both
AoI and throughput optimal in all considered V2V scenarios.
In the future, we would like to investigate whether there
exists a mathematical relationship between AoI and collision
risk, so that an optimization technique, like, gradient descent
based technique, can be utilized to compute optimal beacon
rates for undertaken V2V scenario. Additionally, we would
propose a novel adaptive beacon rate algorithm that minimizes
AoI (and thus, enhances safety application reliability), while
considering vehicle densities and queuing considerations.
REFERENCES
[1] G. Naik, B. Choudhury, and J.-M. Park, “IEEE 802.11 bd & 5G NR
V2X: Evolution of Radio Access Technologies for V2X Communica-
tions,” IEEE Access, 2019.
[2] J. Aznar-Poveda, E. Egea-Lopez, A. Garcia-Sanchez, and P. Pavon-
Maria´o, “Time-to-collision-based awareness and congestion control for
vehicular communications,” IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 154192–154208,
2019.
[3] S. Kaul, M. Gruteser, V. Rai, and J. Kenney, “Minimizing age of infor-
mation in vehicular networks,” in 2011 8th Annual IEEE Communica-
tions Society Conference on Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communications
and Networks, pp. 350–358, June 2011.
[4] N. Gupta, A. Prakash, and R. Tripathi, “Medium access control protocols
for safety applications in vehicular ad-hoc network: A classification
and comprehensive survey,” Vehicular Communications, vol. 2, no. 4,
pp. 223–237, 2015.
[5] H. P. Luong, M. Panda, H. L. Vu, and B. Q. Vo, “Beacon rate
optimization for vehicular safety applications in highway scenarios,”
IEEE Trans. on Vehicular Technology, vol. 67, no. 1, pp. 524–536, 2017.
[6] S. Rezaei, R. Sengupta, and H. Krishnan, “Reducing the communication
required by dsrc-based vehicle safety systems,” in 2007 IEEE Intelligent
Transportation Systems Conference, pp. 361–366, Sep. 2007.
[7] H.-H. Nguyen and H.-Y. Jeong, “Mobility-adaptive beacon broadcast for
vehicular cooperative safety-critical applications,” IEEE Transactions on
Intelligent Transportation Systems, vol. 19, no. 6, pp. 1996–2010, 2017.
[8] Y. P. Fallah, C.-L. Huang, R. Sengupta, and H. Krishnan, “Analysis of
information dissemination in vehicular ad-hoc networks with application
to cooperative vehicle safety systems,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular
Technology, vol. 60, no. 1, pp. 233–247, 2010.
[9] A. Dayal, E. Colbert, V. Marojevic, and J. Reed, “Risk controlled beacon
transmission in v2v communications,” in 2019 IEEE 89th Vehicular
Technology Conference (VTC2019-Spring), pp. 1–6, IEEE, 2019.
[10] F. Lyu, H. Zhu, N. Cheng, Y. Zhu, H. Zhou, W. Xu, G. Xue, and
M. Li, “Abc: Adaptive beacon control for rear-end collision avoidance in
vanets,” in 2018 15th Annual IEEE International Conference on Sensing,
Communication, and Networking (SECON), pp. 1–9, IEEE, 2018.
[11] S. Son and K.-J. Park, “Beat: Beacon inter-reception time ensured
adaptive transmission for vehicle-to-vehicle safety communication,” in
Sensors, 2019.
[12] A. Baiocchi and I. Turcanu, “A model for the optimization of beacon
message age-of-information in a vanet,” in 2017 29th International
Teletraffic Congress (ITC 29), vol. 1, pp. 108–116, IEEE, 2017.
[13] I. Llatser, A. Festag, and G. Fettweis, “Vehicular communication perfor-
mance in convoys of automated vehicles,” in 2016 IEEE International
Conference on Communications (ICC), pp. 1–6, IEEE, 2016.
[14] Y. Ni, L. Cai, and Y. Bo, “Vehicular beacon broadcast scheduling based
on age of information (aoi),” China Communications, vol. 15, no. 7,
pp. 67–76, 2018.
[15] A. Kosta, N. Pappas, V. Angelakis, et al., “Age of information: A new
concept, metric, and tool,” Foundations and Trends R© in Networking,
vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 162–259, 2017.
[16] S. E. Shladover and S.-K. Tan, “Analysis of vehicle positioning accuracy
requirements for communication-based cooperative collision warning,”
Journal of Intelligent Transportation Systems, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 131–
140, 2006.
[17] S. Durrani, X. Zhou, and A. Chandra, “Effect of vehicle mobility on
connectivity of vehicular ad hoc networks,” in 2010 IEEE 72nd Vehicular
Technology Conference-Fall, pp. 1–5, IEEE, 2010.
[18] R. Talak and E. Modiano, “Age-delay tradeoffs in queueing systems,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.05601, 2019.
[19] K. H. Suleiman, T. Javidi, M. Liu, and S. Kittipiyakul, “The impact of
mac buffer size on the throughput performance of ieee 802.11,”
